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The economic analysis of civil wars and insurgencies has become a topic of growing interest in both the academic and policy communities (Blattman and Miguel 2010; World Development Report 2011) . According to the 2011 World Development Report (WDR), a billion and a half people live in countries affected by fragility, conflict or violence, the last being a serious impediment to long-run economic development (WDR 2011) . 2 In those contexts, development programs are now often tasked not only with improving human welfare and enabling development, but also with helping local governments stabilize insecure environments (Berrebi and Olmstead 2011) . 3 Most interpretations of prevailing counterinsurgency theory imply that increasing the quantity or quality of government services will reduce violence (U.S. Army 2007 ). Yet the opposite effect is also plausible: increased economic activity in poorly controlled spaces might raise the returns to predatory violence, therefore motivating even more violence (Hirshleifer 1989; Collier 2000) . Both anecdotal and empirical evidence are mixed. Sudden drops in aid flows correlate with increase violence across countries (Nielsen et. al. 2011 ) and certain kinds of aid appear to be violence reducing (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011, hereafter BSF) . Yet, exogenous increases in economic activity have also been shown to lead to increased violence against civilians (Vanden Eynde 2012 , Berman et. al. 2012 ) and even development programs sometimes yield increased violence, either by creating rents to capture or by disturbing the distribution of power within communities (Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2012a) . The literature has so far not explored the question of optimal development program design for violence-reduction. As stable governments 2 The link between property rights, security, and long-run growth in economics dates back to at least the pioneering work of Douglass North (1981) . Svensson (1998) , for example, extended North's work by modeling the effects of political instability on property rights and, in turn, on investment rates. Gradstein (2004) argues that the enforcement of property rights and economic growth are self-reinforcing. Guillaumont and Chauvet (2003 7-10, 16) find that aid effectiveness declines with political instability. Building on this and related research, the WDR has emphasized the crucial role of improved governance in securing people and property if growth is to be achieved (WDR 2001, 1) . 3 For instance, USAID's top ten benefiting countries in 2012 (obligations) were Afghanistan ($2.2B), Pakistan (0.9B), Jordan (0.5B), Ethiopia (0.4B), Haiti, Kenya and Iraq (0.3B each), DR Congo, Uganda and Tanzania (0.2B each) (USAID, 2013) . graduate out of the class of countries requiring development assistance, an increasing share of aid will predictably be spent in fragile states, including conflict and post-conflict zones, so this gap in knowledge is deeply problematic.
In this paper we use detailed new data on development spending in Iraq to begin closing that gap. Using panel data on development assistance and violent incidents covering the first five years of the Iraq war, we compare the effects of U.S. government spending across several development programs, each with different characteristics. We are guided by the predictions of an information-centric, or "hearts and minds" theory of counterinsurgency in looking for characteristics of effective development program design. We estimate in first differences allowing for various controls to account for endogeneity and selection in the provision of development assistance (BSF, Flores and Nooruddin, 2009 ).
Consistent with the theory's predictions, we find that the violence reducing effects of aid are greater when (a) individual projects are small, (b) troop strength is high, and (c) professional development expertise is available. Controlling for the presence of combat troops and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), the small 9-15 person teams which provided development expertise to military units in Iraq, an additional $50 per capita in spending on aid projects by military units through the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) predicted about six less violent incident per 100,000 residents over the course of a half-year in the average district, which is equivalent to the sample mean, or approximately half the sample median in districts with ongoing fighting. 4 For small CERP projects (<$50,000 in project spending) that violence-reducing effect is six times stronger (i.e., $8/capita to reduce violence by the sample mean). In contrast, most other development assistance programs, including those with large infrastructure projects, show no evidence of violence-reduction, with the exception of USAID's small-scale Community Stabilization Program (CSP).
As predicted by the theory, small scale spending and force levels complement each other; for every additional maneuver battalion (approx. 800 soldiers) present in a district the violence-reducing effect of small CERP projects is roughly doubled.
Development expertise also complements the violence-reducing effect of some development programs. The presence of a PRT amplifies violence reduction of CERP and CSP spending by between 50 and 200 percent, depending on the program.
Our findings should be useful in the design of development programs in conflict and post-conflict environments and may extend to fragile states in general, where assistance may be captured, extorted, or destroyed.
I. Theory: Complementarity of Service Provision and Security in Counterinsurgency
This section explores what an information-centric model of counterinsurgency implies about the complementarity between public service provision and security provision in generating stability. That complementarity is intuitive: government services should be of more value in a secure environment and security will be easier to provide if the local population gives information to security forces, which is more likely if the government provides basic services. To illustrate how the complementarity emerges we build on the three-sided game between government, rebels, and a community, presented in BSF. We first state the assumptions and equilibrium, referring to the original for motivation and proofs, and then develop the results on complementarity.
A. Assumptions

Players and Actions
The government, G, seeks to reduce violence through counterinsurgency effort and service provision. A rebel group, R, seeks to impose costs on government by attacking it. A utility maximizing community, C, can help deliver control of territory to government by anonymously sharing information about rebels.
Sequence of Play
Information sharing by the community requires no preparation so we assume that C moves last. Play proceeds in four stages.
(1) Nature draws community norms favoring rebel control of their territory, n, from a uniform distribution U[n L , n U ]; n is private to C.
(2) G chooses a level of public goods to provide, g, and a level of counterinsurgency effort, m. R simultaneously chooses a level of violence, v, to attempt against G. (Assume n L and n U span enough of the real line to allow
(3) C decides how much information, i, to share with G, having observed the actions of G and R.
(4) Uncertainty regarding control of territory, a, is resolved, and payoffs occur.
Technology of control
Control of territory is a binary state. The variable, a, is one if the government controls the territory, and zero if the territory is controlled by rebels. The probability of government control is (All variables are real numbers unless otherwise specified.)
Payoffs
Community: Community utility is given by
If a=1 (government control) then the community consumes c ≥0, and benefits from government services, g ≥0, so it attains utility U C = u (c + g -n) , where u(.) is continuously differentiable and monotonically increasing. Services are local public goods such as policing, dispute resolution, education, health clinics, utilities, and infrastructure. Community norms, n, generate disutility when government is in control.
Alternatively, if a=0, rebels may successfully carry out violence, v ≥ 0, against government targets. In that case community members will attain utility U C = u(c -v) .
Rebel violence, v, is not directed against community members per se, but we assume that they suffer from it nonetheless, because they are accidentally affected by crossfire, empathize with government employees, or value government targets. In the case of rebel control the community does not benefit at all from government services, g, either because the government withdraws services when it cannot protect its employees and contractors, or because it conditions local public good provision on control, as collective punishment. Conditionality would be unusual for a social welfare maximizing government but is U.S. military policy in administering CERP (U.S. Army, 2006) . Survey evidence reveals that a majority of CERP implementers in Afghanistan practice conditionality. 5 This assumption is clearly extreme; it cannot fully apply to all types of services, such as roads which cannot be easily withdrawn. It could fully apply to services such as policing and justice, and might well partially apply to services such as health and education. We discuss the implications of relaxing conditionality below.
Incorporating the uncertainty that C faces about a , C's expected payoff is
Rebels: Rebels use violence to impose costs on government, either in an attempt to extract concessions, or in an effort to overthrow the government altogether (Tilly, 1978) . In the Iraqi context these attacks would be mostly improvised explosive device (IED) and direct fire attacks against Iraqi government or Coalition forces. Let G's cost of rebel violence be A(v )(1-a), which accounts for the damage caused by an attack. R's benefit from violence is then U R = A(v ) )(1-a), where we assume that A(0) = 0 and that A is an increasing, concave function. Rebels' cost of violence is B(v), which is increasing and convex. (Henceforth, all functions are assumed to be twice continuously differentiable.) So R's expected payoff is
where p ≡ h(m) E(i) .
Note that p = P(a=1) for rebels, for whom i is a random variable.
Government:
The government bears the costs of violence as well as the costs of violence mitigation (counterinsurgency), m, and of service provision, g, and gets expected utility
We assume that D(0) = H(0) = 0, that cost functions D(.) and H(.) are monotonically increasing, and that A(n U )>D'(0) , so that the fixed costs of m are never so high that communities maximally predisposed to not share information are never cost effective for G to engage.
B. Equilibrium
We focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, solving by backwards induction, starting with the community (step #3).
Community:
The community chooses i on the closed interval [0,1] to maximize,
Anticipating results on complementarity, note that since the probability of control is proportional to information shared, public good provision and information are complements, as are counterinsurgency effort and information. Since C chooses i
which implies that either m = 0 or that the best response function of the community
Consumption is neutral; it occurs whether information is shared or not. Norms favoring rebel control reduce incentives to provide i.
Recalling our discussion of conditionality, we can now see why it matters.
Higher g induces C to share information in (4). In the absence of conditionality g would be enjoyed under both government and rebel control, and would provide no incentive for information sharing (i.e., * 1 ↔ ). So in the absence of conditionality, g will have no effect on information-sharing, and therefore no role in the model. In the context of the model's assumptions, then, any estimated effects we find of g are evidence of conditionality.
Define p* ≡ p(i*,m), the probability of government control anticipating optimal information sharing by the community. If m > 0 then E(i*) = P(i*=1) = P (n < g+v ) = F(g+v ) = (g + v -n L )f, where f = , the density of the uniform distribution, so that
Government: Continuing backwards through the sequence of play, the government anticipates (4) and solves
. Under the mild assumption that A(n U ) > D'(0) m=0 cannot be a Nash equilibrium, which simplifies the analysis as it implies that p*>0 in (5). See BSF for proof.
Turning to a solution for m*, Solving cross partials and invoking the implicit function theorem BSF show that best response functions are upward sloping in violence: * │ > 0, and * │ > 0 .
8 Rebels: Rebels simultaneously choose a level of violence to maximize expected violence costs imposed on government, anticipating optimal behavior of C, as in (4).
Solving the first order condition for
The second order condition,
v* is a unique maximum, given g and v, thus the first order condition defines R's best response function v*(g,m) .
which implies that * │ < 0 by the implicit function theorem.) BSF confirm that partial equilibrium prediction empirically, a result that we will revisit below. R's choice of violence also decreases in m, (since
Existence: Assembling results, we have a closed form solution for optimal information sharing by C in stage #3, and three equations in three unknowns that determine best response functions m* (v,g ) and g*(v,m) for G, and v*(g,m) for R in stage #2:
In the general case we cannot solve for closed form solutions for m*, g* and v*, but the concavity of EU R and the convexity of EC G ensure existence of a unique Nash equilibrium (i, v, c, g ). 
C. Complementarity of service provision and enforcement
How should government apply scarce resources to services and counterinsurgency effort? The answer depends on the complementarity of those inputs, which requires a little explanation in a strategic context. Examining Figure 2a , we ask how the slope of the optimal response function v* will change when g is increased, if it becomes steeper (i.e., more negative) then we will say that services complement counterinsurgency effort in inducing rebels to reduce violence.
Proposition 1:
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that this complementarity goes beyond a technological property such as the complementarity of inputs in a production function. It reflects instead the effect of g in enhancing the violence reducing effect of m on the optimal choice of violence by R. The intuition behind this complementarity is technological, though. It follows from the fact that g complements m in the probability of information sharing in (4).
The proof shows that other countervailing forces are dominated by that technological complementarity.
The same intuition underlies the symmetric effect of m on the violence reducing effects of g, as illustrated in Figure 2b , and stated in Proposition 2: * │ < 0 .
Note that the twin complementarity propositions describe partial equilibrium effects, which omit any additional shift in the m* curve, say, as a result of a change in g, . This does not complicate the analysis since m and g are strategic 10 complements (in the government's cost minimization). Thus, the general equilibrium effect of an exogenous increase in g is a further reduction in violence, v, due to the induced increase in m, and the same is true of an exogenous increase in m.
Returning to the question of optimal allocation of resources for government, the problem is analogous to that of a production possibility curve, in which the violent strategic response of rebels is considered negative product. If we recast the government's problem as maximizing stability (negative violence) at minimal cost, This result is quite general. A less restrictive social welfare function might include direct utility from service provision and utility (or disutility) from enforcement, which would generalize our linear indifference curve in Figure 3 by adding some curvature. Graphically, as long as that curve is not too concave to the origin (diminishing returns would imply convexity) the basic result holds: enforcement and service provision should always optimally appear in combination.
In section III below, we jointly test those two propositions using data on troop strength and development spending during the Iraq war.
II. Data and Institutions
Development assistance was provided by an unusually wide range of U.S.
government actors in Iraq, most of whose activities are captured in our data. We measure aid spending using data from the U.S. The U.S. military allocated roughly $3B in aid through its CERP program.
CERP funds were allocated in small amounts, mostly by units at the brigade level (approx. 3,000 soldiers) and below, without layers of subcontracting that made the relationship between dollars spent and work done tenuous for other reconstruction spending programs in Iraq. CERP spending was designed to work like g in our model, by providing military commanders with resources to engage in small-scale projects to meet the needs of local communities, with the aim of garnering the population's support and cooperation. In practice, CERP funds were used to fund a broad range of projects, from salary payments to major infrastructure projects, though the majority went to small-scale local public goods. In contrast, non-CERP projects were often quite large, with a typical project being infrastructure for water and sanitation, or transportation. 9
Besides DOD, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also Appendix Table 1 provides descriptive statistics.
III. Results
Our empirical strategy is a straightforward first-differences design in which we regress changes on conflict on changes in various kinds of aid spending, controlling for lagged changes in violence and changes in Coalition force levels.
Our basic estimating equation is:
, , where , is the number of insurgent attacks (incidents) in district i in period t, , is the amount of development spending of a given type, is a year fixed effect to account for the broad secular trends in the war, and , captures the number of maneuver battalions in district i in period t. The lagged change in violence, , , is included to account for short term, district-specific trends. Since broad trends in violence differed for Sunni areas, we also include a separate year fixed effect interacted with the proportion of Sunni voters. 11
Our empirical strategy will identify the causal impact of changes in aid violence, which is inconsistent with the predictions of our theory. We don't think that this finding overturns the validity of the theory for two reasons: First, the incident data are reported by the troops themselves, so that there is a built in upward bias in locations which have troops present. Second, there appears to be a short term increase in violence on arrival which fades after about half a year, which we suspect is due to a short term learning process in which new troops are initially challenged by insurgents, who then withdraw as the troops develop situational awareness in their area of operations. The sum of the coefficient on contemporaneous troop strength and that on the lag is almost always statistically zero, and will be negative in some of the specifications reported below. Thus, once the upward reporting bias is accounted for, and allowing for a positive endogeneity bias -as described above, the cumulative effect of troop strength appears to be violence reduction (by an unknown amount) after about six months. Table   1 ).
Why are CERP and CSP violence-reducing while other programs are not, and why is small CERP especially so? Firstly, it's worth noting that this contrast reflects the larger literature, in which economic activity, and even aid programs, are sometimes associated with increased violence (i.e., predation, as Berman et al 2012 find in the Philippines, for example) and sometimes with decreased violence, as the theory in section II predicts. Recalling the driving forces of that theory: programs must be conducted in territory secure enough to be implementable, their design must be sufficiently informed about local preferences to benefit the local community; and they must be conditional on cooperation (i.e., information sharing).
Those criteria are consistent with the pattern of results in Table 1 . CERP programs are unusual in that they are secure by design, as they are administered by military units operating in the area. Smaller programs such as CSP, CAP and CERP tend to be better informed, because they are more likely designed in consultation with the local community. And smaller programs are more easily conditioned on the cooperation of communities, in contrast to large infrastructure projects (such as building a water or sewerage system) which cannot easily be revoked. Moreover, survey evidence from Afghanistan reveals that CERP was generally implemented conditionally (see BSF, footnote 11), in contrast to how a development agency such as USAID would typically implement programs, in accordance with a development objective rather than a security objective.
Having discussed how those criteria can rationalize the results in Table 1 , we turn now to testing the implications of that theory. We examine whether security and development expertise complement programs for which we have evidence of effectiveness from Table 1 , namely CERP and CSP. Table 2 tests the hypothesis that security and development are complements, at the district level. Recall that these are actually two conceptually distinct hypotheses (Propositions 1 and 2), since in the context of model complementarity need not be symmetric. Notwithstanding that subtlety, we can test these hypotheses only jointly, by estimating the coefficient γ on the interaction of m and g in the following estimating equation.
, . Should both propositions hold then γ 1 will be negative.
Before turning to results, an issue of measurement requires attention. The model provides no guidance as to how m should be measured (and doctrine is also unclear). What we seek is the capacity of the government to apply coercive force in order to suppress rebel activity. Until now we've measured troop strength in battalions per district, which would be an adequate approximation if troops per physical area were appropriate, following the logic of the response time to a tip or incident being critical. Alternatively, troops per capita would be a good approximation of the ability of the government to police and protect individuals. In Table 2 we report results using both approaches. 12 The left panel of Table 2 reports both main and interaction effects of spending on small CERP, large CERP and CSP (columns (1), (2) and (3)). As predicted by the complementarity propositions, the estimated interaction term is negative in each case. All three coefficients are precisely enough estimated to reject the hypothesis of a zero coefficient in favor of the alternative of complementarity.
The right panel checks robustness to measuring troop strength in battalions per capita (as opposed to per district), again for each of the three programs. The evidence for complementarity in this case is weaker, but consistent with the previous results: two of the three coefficients are negative, and the one which is statistically significant (the CSP x troop strength interaction in column (6) A final testable implication of the model concerns the role of development expertise. Here our interest is in distinguishing the mechanism in the model -which relies on delivering a service, g, of value to the community, from a class of "opportunity cost" models that inject wages and employment into the community regardless of whether a service of value is generated. 13 In other words, for a 18 program to be successful at reducing violence, it must be a development success as well, by delivering desired services to community members. 14 We test the hypothesis that expertise matters by examining the interaction of spending in the three programs with the presence of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the district. Our working assumptions is that when programs are informed by development experts they are more likely to involve consultation with the community on their requested projects, and will be better designed and implemented to effectively meet the community's request. Formally, our hypothesis is that the coefficient γ 2 on the interaction term of g and PRT is negative, where PRT is a binary indicator.
, . Table 3 reports results. Columns (1) reports the main effect of PRT presence in isolation, which is violence reducing (i.e., negative) but not precisely enough estimated to constitute evidence of effectiveness. Twenty nine percent of the population lived in districts with a US PRT present during the sample period. As in our discussion of m and g, endogeneity bias of the PRT coefficient would be away from finding a violence-reducing effect (i.e., positive), if we thought that PRTs were instituted in anticipation of increased , . (No PRTs are withdrawn during our sample period so inference is entirely based on the first half-year of PRT presence.) Establishing a PRT would often involve assembling a team, assigning them a security detail, and sometimes even creating a separate base -if there was none already available, which would make response within a half year unlikely but not impossible. The reported coefficient is robust to removing the troop strength variable, and the lagged violence measure (not shown). Column (2) reports that the estimated violence-reducing main effect of CERP (in Table 1 ) is robust to adding a PRT indicator.
Columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) report our interaction tests. In all cases (CERP, small CERP, large CERP and CSP) the interaction of PRT with development spending yields a negative coefficient, indicating that the violence-reducing effects of these programs are enhanced by PRT presence. Those interactions effects are statistically significant at the 10% for large CERP, and at the 1% level for small CERP. Small CERP projects are almost three times as violence-reducing (-.067+-0.36 vs. -.036) when a PRT is present in the district. That pattern of complementarity is illustrated in Figure 5 , which shows the increase in violence reduction (the slope) when a PRT is present.
Taking the evidence in Tables 1 -3 together, we can draw some conclusions.
Development spending is most violence-reducing when it is secure, which addresses the puzzle posed by Table 1 by the relative effectiveness of small CERP programs.
Development spending is also more violence reducing when it is informed by local development experts. Small projects are more likely to be violence-reducing, which may reflect the fact that they are better informed, or may be due to their lending themselves more readily to conditional implementation. 15 Conversely, troop strength is more violence-reducing (or at least less violence-increasing, as measured) when small-scale development spending is present. Finally, the data suggest that smaller projects show stronger complementarities with expertise and with security, which may reflect a further complementarity between conditionality and both security on the one hand and expertise on the other.
IV. Conclusion
Overall the evidence from Iraq suggests that, in accordance with the informationcentric (or "Hearts and Minds") framework laid out, aid spending which is small, conditional, secure, and effective as a development program creates incentives for 15 In results not reported we find no statistically significant complementarities between either troop strength or PRTs on the one hand, and any of the other programs measured in Table 1 on the other. We cautiously interpret that as evidence that the conditionality and security that small projects allow is a necessary condition for violence-reduction in development spending. cooperation with government that large, less secure and less informed projects do not.
More generally, our theoretical perspective suggests a number of practical lessons for aid programs. Complementarity, as illustrated by Figure 3 , indicates that a government wishing to suppress violence at minimal cost would mix the use of development efforts and coercive force, rather than exclusively use one or the other.
Evidence suggests that most rebel groups recognize that logic and likewise mix governance initiatives with coercion. 16 These insights are drawn from the U.S. and Coalition experience in Iraq as an occupying force, and then later in support of a domestic government combating a very violent insurgency. Yet based on our experience applying the same model to other fragile environments, we hypothesize that these lessons may well apply more generally to domestic governments or to international assistance to local allies.
Sufficient conditions for development assistance to be stability enhancing in places where a rebel of criminal element can capture or destroy projects are apparently these: they should be modest, secure, conditional, and informed by local preferences. Moreover engaging development expertise, rather than simply spending funds, augments the stabilization effect. For instance, keeping development experts hunkered down far from projects sites is unlikely to be violence-reducing. A logical corollary of complementarity between development and security provision is that foreign assistance to governments fighting insurgencies will be more effective when it includes capacity building in both g and m. Investing in training security forces is a standard component of "small footprint" intervention, yet governance assistance is typically limited to training for those who will manage government agencies. Our analysis suggests that training those who would implement local service provision may have a greater immediate violence-reduction effect. In the same vein, security forces, once trained, will be more effective if redeployed out of large, insulated bases and instead engaging the local population in a way that complements development efforts. 16 See BSF for discussion.
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Finally, it is worth putting these results in context. Modest, secure, informed and conditional should be thought of as sufficient conditions for violence-reduction.
Further research is required to establish where and to what extent they are all necessary. Further research may also reveal the extent to which a mix of capacity building in both coercive and benign governance can generate medium and long run stabilization -beyond a half-year or one year horizon. The iso-stability lines of Figure 3 are drawn for a given set of norms and expectations. As expectations of quality of governance improve, including political development and representation, enhanced legitimacy should improve norms of cooperation with government --rather than with rebels or criminals. That would shift iso-stability lines to lower levels of violence at the same cost to government in the medium and long term, and allow governments (and allies) the option of shifting spending away from coercive force and toward traditional development programs. (1)- (3)) with mean 1.12. Troop strength is measured in battalions per 100K population in the right panel (columns (4)-(6)) with mean of 0.22 . Regressions are weighted by population and include year effects, and Sunni vote-year interactions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
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